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 1 
`A War of Position? The Thatcher Government’s Preparation for the 
1984 Miners’ Strike. 
 
 
Abstract.   
 
It has sometimes been suggested that the Thatcher government 
approached the miners’ strike of 1984/5 with plans that had been 
conceived long in advance.  This article argues that Conservatives did 
discuss the prospect of a strike from the mid 1970s. However, they 
did not have clearly worked out plans or much confidence in their 
ability to win and they became even more cautious after their 
humiliating retreat when faced with the threat of a strike in February 
1981.  Stockpiling coal was, initially, designed to deter a strike rather 
than to ‘win’ one. Only slowly did some Tories reconcile themselves 
to the prospect that there was likely to be a strike and that 1984 was 
the least bad time to face it.  Furthermore, Thatcher herself was not 
always keen to take the miners on and many of those who did most 
to prepare and execute government strategy in this area were not 





There is very little prospect of the Government and the Board 
inflicting total defeat on the NUM either now or later.1 
 





 I am grateful for comments on drafts on this article from Tim Bale, David 
Edgerton, Tom Hurst, Tom Kelsey, Helen Parr, Paul Readman, Robert Saunders, 
Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and three anonymous referees. 
1Thatcher Foundation Website (TFW) 135923, Lawson to Thatcher, 8 Jan. 1982. 
This article draws on documents from the National Archives at Kew as well as 
some at Churchill College Cambridge, in the Conservative Party Archives in 
Oxford and at the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University. Many 
documents at Kew and Cambridge are available on the Thatcher Foundation 
Website and, when this is the case, I have given the identifying number for the 
website rather than the original archive classification. 
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I continue to be apprehensive about future pay and other demands 
by the miners … In the foreseeable future it will never be safe to 
assume that a confrontation can be ‘won’. 2   
 
Robin Ibbs (outgoing head of Central Policy Review Staff), 23 March 
1982. 
 
Events have not, however, challenged the post-war impression of 
their [the miners’] invincibility for we have yet to beat a national 
stoppage.3 
 
Bernard Ingham (Prime Minister’s press secretary), 10 March 1983. 
 
 
The miners’ strike of 1984-5 – widely recognized as the single most 
important episode in the domestic politics of the Thatcher 
government - has been the subject of numerous studies. However, 
some of these publications have neglected, perhaps obscured, 
important questions.  This is because the strike has been largely seen 
from the point of view of the miners or their supporters. 4  It has also 
often been seen in social and cultural, rather than political, terms. 
Indeed, some scholars assume that the political prelude to the strike 
has already been established and consequently emphasize their own 
challenge to ‘the dominant narratives of the strike, which remain 
wedded to high politics’.5  
 
Little has been said about the light that official documents released 
since 2010 might shed on the ‘high politics of the strike’. These 
documents include a long report by Central Policy Review Staff 
 
2TFW 123002, Ibbs to Thatcher, 23 March 1982. 
3TFW, 138796, Ingham to Vereker, 10 March 1983. 
4Martin Adeney and John Lloyd,  The Miners’ Strike, 1984-5: Loss without Limit 
(London, 1986); Francis Beckett and David Hencke,  Marching to the Fault Line: 
the Miners’ Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain (London, 2009);  Andrew 
Richards,  Miners on Strike: Class Solidarity and Division in Britain (Oxford, 1996); 
Peter Gibbon and David Steyne (eds), Thurcroft: a Village and the Miners’ Strike, 
an Oral History (Nottingham, 1986); Tony Parker,  Redhill: a Mining Community 
(London, 1986); Roger Seifert and John Urwin, Struggle without End: The 1984/5 
Miners’ Strike in North Staffordshire (Newcastle, Staffs, 1987);  David Waddington 
, Maggie Wykes and Chas Critcher, Split at the Seams: Community, Continuity and 
Change after the 1984-5 Coal Disputes (Milton Keynes, 1991). 
5Jim Phillips,  ‘Material and Moral Resources: the 1984-5 Miners’ Strike in 
Scotland’, The Economic History Review,  (2012) LXV, 256-276. 
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(CPRS) in July 1981, the existence of which seems to have been 
unknown to the authors of the official history of the CPRS,6 the 
proceedings of an ‘Official Committee on Coal’, which was established 
in 1981 and met up to, and during, the strike, and numerous notes by 
ministers and officials:  one civil servant, John Vereker, wrote at least 
twenty four such notes, four of them addressed to the Prime Minister.  
This neglect is part of a more general phenomenon.  Documentary 
releases have had relatively little effect on interpretations of the 
Thatcher government - perhaps because the first, often 
contemporaneous, accounts of it were painted in such compellingly 
vivid colours. With particular regard to the miners’ strike, two views, 
first expressed during the 1980s, remain influential. The first is that 
‘deep-laid Conservative plans’7 or an ‘open conspiracy’,8 dating from 
the 1970s, ‘provided much of the basis for the Conservative 
government’s strategy in decisively defeating the 1984–85 miners’ 
strike.’9  The second is that planning for a miners’ strike was a 
specifically Thatcherite project and that, indeed, it was associated 
with Margaret Thatcher personally.   
 
In his authorized biography of Margaret Thatcher, Charles Moore 
advances a more nuanced view about the timescale on which the 
government planned for a miners’ strike. For him, the plans were 
formulated not in the 1970s but in the aftermath of the government’s 
retreat in the face of a threatened miners’ strike in February 1981.  
All the same, Moore believes that long-term plans underlay the 
government’s strategy. Furthermore, like earlier writers, though with 
a different moral spin from most of them, Moore lays a heavy 
emphasis on Thatcher’s personal role.10 Oddly the fact that he draws 
on interviews with the great and good sharpens his focus on 
Thatcher. The civil servants and ministers who surrounded her tend 
to disappear from view because we are looking through their eyes 
rather than at them.  Moore says little about how far such people 
 
6Tessa Blackstone and William Plowden, Inside the Think Tank: Advising the 
Cabinet, 1971-1983 (London, 1988). 
7Alex Callinicos and Mike Simons, The Great Strike: the Miners’ Strike of 1984-5 
and its Lessons (London, 1985). 
8John Saville, ‘An Open Conspiracy: Conservative Politics and the Miners’ Strike 
1984-5’, Socialist Register, 22 (1985/6), pp. 295-329. 
9 Peter Dorey, ‘Conciliation or Confrontation with the Trade Unions? The 
Conservative Party’s ‘Authority of Government Group’,1975-1978’, Historical 
Studies in Industrial Relations 27/28 (Spring/Autumn, 2009), 135-51.  
10Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher, the Authorized Biography, II: Everything She 
Wants (London, 2015) pp. 143 and 181.  
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might have been actors in, rather than merely observers of, the 
making of policy. 
 
 
This article will argue that preparation for the coal strike was more 
complicated than either Moore or earlier commentators have 
suggested. It will draw on recently released documents. It will, 
however, be stressed that extensive documentation does not produce 
certainty.  People sometimes wrote most when they were least sure 
of what to do. Equally, records are least extensive for the period after 
September 1983, when the government seemed most resolved to 
face a strike. Much planning was secret. Some documents found their 
way into the archives even when their authors had written ‘we dare 
not risk the enclosed note getting into the official machine’,11 but one 
assumes that others were destroyed and there were times, 
particularly in the period immediately preceding the strike, when a 
deliberate decision was taken not to record some discussions. 
 
My argument is narrowly framed in two respects. First, it focuses the 
years leading up to the beginning of the strike in March 1984 and 
discusses the events of the strike itself only insofar as they reveal 
something about pre-strike planning. Since the notion of a 
government plan that was worked out before the strike plays such an 
important role in the literature on the strike, government planning 
during this period deserves particular attention.  Secondly, this 
article is mainly about the government. It discusses the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and, for that matter, the National Coal 
Board (NCB), which had been created by the nationalization of the 
mines in 1947, only in so far as beliefs about these bodies informed 
government action.  ‘Government’ in this context is taken to mean 
ministers but also political advisors and civil servants, who were 
more than just the executors of policy decided by their political 
masters. Many of those civil servants and political advisors who were 
most active in this domain derived their influence partly from their 
relations with the Prime Minister, though this does not necessarily 
mean that they expressed Thatcher’s own opinions, which were 
sometimes inscrutable. 
 
I will argue that ministers and officials anticipated and, to some 
extent, prepared for a strike from an early stage.  However, this does 
 
11TFW 151044, Gow to Thatcher, 14 November 1980. 
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not mean that they had clearly-worked out plans for achieving their 
victory over the NUM in 1984/5. The very fact that a potential strike 
was discussed so much reflected uncertainty about what would, and 
should, happen. There were multiple plans – some of which, such as 
the quixotic suggestion that enthusiasts who ran narrow-gauge 
railways might be recruited to drive coal trains, 12 bore little relation 
to what the government ultimately did. The making of policy with 
regard to the miners was not the preserve of Thatcherite radicals. It 
involved former Heathites as well as many who were not members of 
the Conservative party at all. In any case, no one faction controlled 
policy making in this area because dealing with a strike required 
multiple agencies, which was one of the things that had made the 
government less quick on its feet than the NUM during the 1970s.13  
When the strike finally came, almost half of Cabinet ministers were 
members of the committee that coordinated policy. 14 
 
An understanding of how the government prepared for conflict with 
the miners also has implications for broader debates about 
‘Thatcherism’.  First, and not surprisingly, the Thatcher government 
was more cautious and pragmatic in the implementation of policy 
than the rhetoric of both Thatcherites and their opponents implied. 
Secondly, and related to this, historians have sometimes studied 
what Thatcherites said more than what the Thatcher government 
did.  The difference between words and deeds was partly a difference 
between opposition and government but it was also associated with 
the shift in gear that came after the 1983 election.  The second 
Thatcher government was more confident than the first and placed a 
greater emphasis on action rather than reflection. Thirdly, not all 
policies of the Thatcher government were ‘Thatcherite’. Some fitted 
into a consensus that commanded wide support among the 
establishment.   Finally, in case it is not obvious, I should stress that 
 
12London, National Archives (TNA) CAB 130/1173, Official Group on Coal, report 
by secretaries, 10 July 1981. 
13TFW 111390, Authority of Government Group, 21 July 1976, Lord Armstrong 
expressed concern ‘that the chain of command on the Government side was very 
much longer than the chain of command on the union side.’ 
14The Ministerial Group on Coal (MISC 101) was chaired by Whitelaw (Deputy 
Prime Minister) and generally included the Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the 
Secretary of State for Energy, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State for 
Employment and minsters representing the Scottish Office, the Ministry of 
Defence, Transport and the Department of Trade and Industry. This committee, 
established during the strike and made up of politicians, is not to be confused 
with MISC 57, made up of civil servants, that prepared for a strike. 
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my title is slightly mischievous - since one of my aims is to turn 
attention away from the Gramscian emphasis on ideological 
hegemony, which has sometimes characterized writing on 






Since Edward Heath, Thatcher’s predecessor as leader of the 
Conservative party, had been brought down as Prime Minister by a 
miners’ strike in 1974, Thatcher and her colleagues always knew that 
the NUM posed a threat.16 Discussions of the matter were conducted 
with discretion: ‘political realism at a delicate point in the 
NUM/Conservative party relations required that any consideration of 
the restructuring of the industry be kept secret.’17 In spite of this, 
parts of two confidential documents that touched on relations of a 
future Conservative government with the NUM were leaked to the 
press. The first of these was a report on the ‘Authority of 
Government’ that met from 1975 to 1977.  It was chaired by Lord 
Carrington, a Tory frontbencher since the 1960s, who was to be 
Thatcher’s first Foreign Secretary. The report’s tone was pessimistic.  
Carrington himself remarked: ‘there might be advantages in saying in 
our report that the Government cannot win a miners’ strike, but it 
can make sure everyone else suffers from it … if you could not win, 
then you should not try’.18  
 
The second discussion of the miners came in the ‘Ridley report’ of 
1977, part of which was leaked to The Economist in 1978. This was, in 
fact, an annex on ‘countering the political threat’ to a report on 
 
15Stuart Hall,  ‘Gramsci and Us’, Marxism Today (June 1987). 
16Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, this edn. 1995), p. 340. 
17Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archives CRD 4/11/1m, meeting 
of Energy Group, 18 March 1976.  
18TFW 111380, Authority of Government Group, 22 October 1975. William 
Waldegrave leaked the outlines of this report to the journalist Peter Hennessy – 
though Waldegrave, a member of the committee, came to believe that it had been 
chaired by Prior rather than Carrington: an illustration of how Prior came to be 
blamed for almost every sign of weakness that the Tories displayed in dealing 
with the unions.  William Waldegrave. A Different Kind of Weather: a Memoir 
(London, 2015), p. 201. The full record of meetings of the Group was kept by 
another member, George Younger, and is now available on the Thatcher 
Foundation Website. 
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nationalized industries prepared by a committee that was chaired by 
the Conservative MP Nicholas Ridley. It described the mines as the 
‘most likely’ area for conflict between a future Conservative 
government and the unions and it anticipated some tactics,  the 
circumvention of rail transport by road hauliers or the deployment of 
a more centralized police force,  that were used in 1984. 19   The 
Ridley report, or at least that part of it that had been leaked, became 
notorious during the strike and was often presented as a blue print 
for government action. One historian has suggested that: ‘The … 
more ‘positive’ analysis and recommendations of the Ridley Report 
were wholly in accordance with Thatcher’s own ideological views 
and political instincts’ and that it supplanted Carrington’s report.20 It 
is true that the Carrington committee was largely made up of men 
who had been close to Heath while Ridley was close to Thatcher, and 
bitterly hostile to Heath. However, it would be simplistic to see the 
two reports in terms of ‘Heathism’ versus ‘Thatcherism’. Carrington 
was senior to Ridley, even after Thatcher became leader, as were 
several members of Carrington’s committee. There is, in fact, little 
evidence that, once they were in power, Conservatives referred back 
to the Ridley report; indeed, Conservative Central Office had trouble 
finding a copy.21 In any case, only a partial reading of the Ridley 
report could present it as a blue print for government policy in 1984.  
Ridley anticipated a confrontation that would occur within a year or 
eighteen months of a Conservative election victory. He also suggested 
that the government parry the threat of a strike by buying off 
powerful workers and that it might ‘provoke a battle in a non-
vulnerable industry where we can win.’ Coal was not regarded as a 
‘non-vulnerable’ industry.  Indeed the tone of the Ridley report 
seemed to anticipate the government’s humiliation in February 1981 
(see below) rather than its victory in 1985.  
 
Far from coming to power with a plan to defeat the miners, 
Thatcher’s tenure in office began with a mood of gloom on this topic. 
Officials told ministers that any industrial action by miners, even 
short of an outright strike, would force restrictions on the use of 
electricity: ‘There are no other steps which can be taken to brighten 
 
19TFW 110795, Report of Nationalised Industries Policy Group, 30 June 1977. 
See also Cambridge, Churchill College Archives Centre, Papers of Lord Hailsham, 
HLSM 2/42/2/55, ‘Interim Report’. 
20Dorey, ‘Conciliation or Confrontation?’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 
27/28 (2009), 135-51. 
21Adeney and Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike, 1984-5, p. 73.  
 8 
that picture.’22  John Hoskyns, the head of the Number 10 Policy Unit 
and a political appointment who regarded himself as a Thatcherite, 
wrote in July in terms that were similar to those that Carrington had 
used a few years previously: ‘though we can’t win a strike against 
them [the miners] … we will definitely make the strike long and 
expensive (i.e. a negative sum game) because that is the only 
deterrent open to us.’23 
 
There was one domain in which government policy was informed, 
from the first, by the prospect of having to deal with a miners’ strike. 
Conservative ministers were interested in nuclear power partly 
because, as some of them noted in 1979, it would ‘have the advantage 
of removing a substantial proportion of electricity production from 
the dangers of disruption by industrial action by coal miners or 
transport workers.’24 Nigel Lawson, Energy Secretary from 1981 to 
1983, recognized that the government’s enthusiasm for nuclear 
power (which he came to regard, in retrospect, as economically 
unwise) owed much to the perception that it might be ‘a means of 
emancipation from Arthur Scargill’ and that ‘diversification’ of energy 
sources was ‘code for freedom from NUM blackmail.’25  However, in a 
curious way, reference to the nuclear industry illustrated 
government pessimism about the prospects of defeating the miners.   
Nuclear power would only have an effect in the very long term. As it 
turned out, the government did not manage to commission a single 
new reactor until after the end of the 1984/5 coal strike. Nuclear 
power featured little in the detailed discussions of how to manage a 
strike that began after February 1981 (see below).   
 
In 1980, the government discussed ways to reduce the losses 
incurred by the Coal Board.  The Energy Secretary – David Howell - 
put forward plans that anticipated closing the least productive pits 
but balancing this with investment in more profitable mines. 
However, demand for coal declined because of a general economic 
recession and the Coal Board began to accumulate stocks of coal, 
which, at that stage, it did not want.  In February 1981, a list of pits 
 
22TFW 116623, note by deputy chairman of the Civil Contingencies Unit, attached 
to note signed by Armstrong and others, 30 November 1979. 
23 Cambridge,  Churchill College Archive Centre, Papers of John Hoskyns, 2/125, 
Hoskyns to Duguid, 23 July 1980. 
24TFW 116497, Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy, 23 October 1979. 
25Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (this edn, 
London, 1993), pp. 166, 168. 
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that the Coal Board proposed to close was leaked and some miners 
walked out. A national strike seemed likely and stocks of coal would 
not have lasted for long. Within a week, the government backed 
down.  Plans to close pits were abandoned and the government 
sought to reduce coal imports by pressing other nationalized 
industries to use great quantities of expensive British coal.  It was a 
humiliating defeat. A civil servant noted that it ‘left the NUM with the 
initiative on all fronts’.26 
 
The Cabinet was bitterly divided in early 1981, particularly over the 
forthcoming budget, and this may have contributed to the sense of 
political weakness that made Thatcher reluctant to pick a fight with 
the miners. However, conflict between ‘wets’ and ‘dries’, over 
monetary policy, only partially overlapped with that between ‘hawks’ 
and ‘doves’ over trade unions. In private conversations, Thatcher 
blamed the most important Cabinet dove, Jim Prior, the Employment 
Secretary, for the climb down,27 and her entourage seems to have 
relayed this impression to Fleet Street,28 but Cabinet minutes record 
‘unanimous support’ for the decision.29  Insiders attributed 
responsibility to Thatcher herself. Some of them admired the speed 
with which she decided to ‘cut and run’,30 though a normally loyal 
minister complained that the Prime Minister was ‘all piss and wind.’31  
  
After February 1981, the battle lines were drawn. The government 
could only stop the Coal Board from being a drain on public finances 
 
26TNA CAB 184/527/1, Lankester to Ibbs, 12 May 1981.   
27Warwick University, Modern Records Centre, archives of Confederation of 
British Industry, MSS 200/C/3/DG4/13, Terrence Beckett (the head of the CBI) 
met Thatcher on 11 March 1981. He recorded: ‘The climb down advocated by 
James Prior on the miners, the fact that this had to be paid for and that some 
members of her Cabinet including James Prior did not support a tough budget 
had obviously incensed her.’ 
28Prior extracted damages from the Daily Express when it alleged that he had met 
the leader of the NUM before the climb-down. Jim Prior, A Balance of Power 
(1986), p. 169. Prior and Gormley had met some weeks earlier – though 
apparently to talk about general issues rather than a potential miners’ strike. See 
Joe Gormley, Battered Cherub: an Autobiography (1982), p. 181.  David Howell 
reported that Gormley had tried to reach him by telephone in mid-February 
1981 but, having failed to do so, had spoken to Prior instead.  TFW 126038, 
Lankester to West, 17 February 1981. 
29TFW 127194, Cabinet minutes, confidential annex, 19 February 1981. 
30Charles Moore, Everything She Wants, p. 143. 
31John Hoksyns, Just in Time: Inside the Thatcher Revolution (London, 2000), p. 
280, remarks made by Cecil Parkinson. 
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if it closed pits, but the miners would resist closures. Furthermore, 
the problems in the industry lay with management as well as the 
union.32  This was partly because the government saw the Coal Board 
management as excessively prone to co-operate with the union.  It 
was, more generally, because the Coal Board – even more than other 
nationalized industries – enjoyed a monopoly.  Nigel Lawson, then 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, wrote in April 1981 about the 
need to  ‘build a successful coal industry independent of government 
subsidies; to de-monopolize it and ultimately open it to private 
enterprise …we will make no progress towards our aim until we deal 
with the problem of monopoly union power.’33  The Chancellor, 
Geoffrey Howe, wrote: ‘the NCB see their interest in many respects as 
coinciding with the NUM’s for example in maximizing coal 
production … without regard to profitability.’34 
 
However, knowing where the battle lines were did not mean the 
government showed immediate enthusiasm to attack.   On the 
contrary, in the aftermath of February 1981, ministers and civil 
servants seem, for a time, to have abandoned the idea that structural 
reforms might make the coal industry more efficient in the near 
future.  One result of this was that they concentrated on the limited 
goal of holding down pay, a matter of particular concern because of 
the risk that high wages for miners would stimulate demands by 
workers in other industries: ‘Present thinking is that over the next 
two years, at least, pay is the top priority. To confront the NUM over 
closures, imports and investments, as happened last February, would 
merely increase the chances of greater militancy over pay.’35  
 
The government also sought to extend the length of time that it 
would be able endure a miners’ strike, but this did not mean that it 
was seeking one. On the contrary, some hoped that ostentatious 
preparedness might deter the miners from striking,36 or even 
thought that it was worth ‘exaggerating the stock position’37 
Deterrence and other incentives not to strike might go together. An 
 
32TFW 135946, CPRS report ‘NCB/NUM problem’, though dated on the Thatcher 
Foundation website to March 1982, this report seems, in fact, to have been 
finished on 31 July 1981. 
33Lawson, The View from No. 11, p. 142. 
34TFW 126077, Howe to Thatcher, 5 June 1981. 
35TNA CAB 184/527/2, Turner to Beauman, 13 July 1981.  
36TFW 126501, Vereker to Duguid, 18 November 1981. 
37TFW 126477, note by Julian West, 5 August 1981. 
 11 
official wrote of ‘deterrence at the margin under circumstances of a 
reasonable offer.’38 The government might offer a generous pay rise 
while underlining that the alternative to accepting such an offer 
would be the unattractive prospect of a long strike.  In this 
complicated world of bluff, some talked of ‘poker’, ‘gamesmanship’,39 
and even, to use a metaphor that was never far from anyone’s mind 
in the early 1980s, mutually assured destruction: ‘The main value of a 
willingness to take on the miners is its deterrent effect: just like the 





Cabinet ministers, and, a fortiori, the Prime Minister herself, were too 
busy with the day-to-day business of government to give sustained 
attention to the miners. Detailed planning meant turning to civil 
servants and/or political advisors.  Since a miners’ strike was 
regarded as a matter of high importance, planning for it took place at 
the commanding heights of the British state among those who 
provided direct advice to the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet. The 
Prime Minister’s own civil service private secretaries were closely 
involved.  In addition to this, the matter was discussed by the 
Number 10 Policy Unit. This was small: in 1980, it contained three 
people. It had been composed of political appointments, people paid 
by the public purse but appointed on a temporary basis because of 
their sympathies for the government.  In the autumn of 1979, to 
Thatcher’s disquiet, a career civil servant was also attached to the 
Unit. 41   Alongside this was the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), 
which had been established in 1970, it was part of the Cabinet Office 
and existed to provide advice to the whole Cabinet rather than just 
the Prime Minister. It employed between fifteen and twenty people. 
Appointments to it were not explicitly political and it contained civil 
servants on temporary postings as well as those who had been 
seconded from outside government. After the government climb-
down of 1981, a new committee – MISC 57 or the Official Committee 
on Coal – was established to discuss a possible miners’ strike. This 
met for several years. It was chaired by Robert Wade-Gery, a 
 
38TFW 126501, Vereker to Duguid, 18 November 1981. 
39 TNA CAB 184/572/2, Bailey to Beauman, 13 July 1981. 
40TFW 126057, Hoskyns to Thatcher, ‘Lessons of the NUM Strike Threat’, 27 
March 1981.  
41Hoskyns, Just in Time, p. 119. 
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diplomat attached to the Cabinet Office, until April 1982 and, 
thereafter by Peter Gregson, an official of the Department of Trade 
and Industry also attached to the Cabinet Office.42   
 
In theory, there was a sharp distinction between the apoliticism of 
career civil servants and the explicit commitment of political 
advisors: a distinction that was much discussed in the 1980s when 
radical government policies seemed to cut across the established 
routines of the civil service. John Hoskyns, the first head of Thatcher’s 
Policy Unit, was bitterly hostile to ‘Whitehall’.  He told Thatcher that 
‘dissidents’ were as ‘uncomfortable to the Civil Service as Solidarity is 
to the Polish government’.43 Hoskyns’ successor as head of the Policy 
Unit, Ferdinand Mount, was to write that ‘the higher reaches of the 
Civil Service which was almost entirely antipathetic to her [Thatcher] 
personally and to her economic policy.’44 
 
 In reality, the distinction between political advisors and civil 
servants was more blurred than official etiquette, and Thatcherite 
rhetoric, implied. Civil servants appointed to serve alongside political 
advisors in the Policy Unit – Andrew Duguid, Andrew Vereker and 
Nicholas Owen  –  were particularly important in discussion of a 
potential miners’ strike. Hoskyns and Mount wrote approvingly 
about these officials as though they were exceptions that proved the 
rules about Whitehall – though, in fact, Hoskyns and Mount worked 
amicably with many civil servants during their time in Downing 
Street.  The Policy Unit worked with the CPRS on planning for a 
miners’ strike and, when the latter body was dissolved in 1983, the 




42Wade-Gery’s own account of his career can be found in his interview with 
Malcolm McBain for the British Diplomatic Oral History Project (BDOHP) 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/bdohp/. Wade-Gery recalls 
that he was entrusted with preparing for a miners’ strike within weeks of the 
1979 election at a meeting involving Thatcher and Whitelaw. A similar interview 
seems to inform Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher, the Authorized Biography, I, 
From Grantham to the Falklands, (2013), p.537. I have found no trace of such a 
meeting in the archives but the meeting to which Wade-Gery alludes sounds like 
the one that occurred on 14 April 1981 (TFW 126063), which led Whitelaw to 
produce a report on ‘Withstanding a Coal Strike’ on 22 July 1981 (TFW 126468).    
43TFW 122722, Hoskyns to Thatcher, 10 January 1982. 
44Ferdinand Mount, Cold Cream: My Early Life and Other Mistakes (2008), p. 308. 
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Some civil servants, especially in the Department of Energy, were 
promoted because they were seen as sympathetic to the 
government’s programme.45  There is, however, little evidence of 
such intervention in the Cabinet Office or among the civil servants in 
Downing Street. Thatcher herself was nervous of anything that might 
be construed as direct intervention in civil service careers.  Many 
officials had already been in place before Thatcher’s election. Robert 
Wade-Gery – the civil servant who did the most detailed planning for 
a miners’ strike - was admired by the Thatcherite Nigel Lawson and 
worked well with Thatcher herself: it was he who relayed the order 
to sink the Argentinian ship The General Belgrano during the 
Falklands War. He was, however, a stereotypical mandarin – a 
Wykhamist and a fellow of All Souls. He had served in the CPRS 
during the Heath government and had been appointed to the Civil 
Contingencies Unit of the Cabinet Office under the Labour 
government of the late 1970s. His appointment as a Deputy Secretary 
of the Cabinet Office had been decided before the 1979 election.46 If 
he had a political patron, it was not Lawson or Thatcher but William 
Whitelaw.47 Wade-Gery was more discreet than some of his civil 
service colleagues in that the written record reflected his concern to 
work within the terms of reference laid down by ministers - though 
he seems to have been less inhibited about the expression of his own 
views in oral communications.48 
 
The convergence between civil servants and politically appointed 
advisers did not necessarily reflect government imposition on the 
civil service. Officials, especially the young and ambitious officials in 
Downing Street and the Cabinet office, welcomed the action and 
excitement that went with a radical government and were perhaps 
simply affected by the general atmosphere of the 1980s.  Tim 
Lankester, a civil servant since the 1960s, was bequeathed to 
Thatcher as a private secretary by her Labour predecessor James 
Callaghan. Nonetheless, Lankester remarked that he found the 
 
45Lawson, The View from No 11, p. 134/5. 
46TFW 118847, Hunt to Thatcher, 5 April 1979. 
47On the relation between Whitelaw and Wade-Gery see the interview with the 
latter (BDHOP). 
48 TFW 126074, Duguid to Lankester 29 May 1981: ‘Robert Wade-Gery is himself 
very conscious of the limitations of terms of reference … of his … group to 
examine wider questions of policy towards the NCB. He therefore welcomed 
John Hoskyns’s proposal that a group be set up to look at these questions 
urgently.’ Wade-Gery told Hoskyns in August 1981 that the Department of 
Energy was ‘not to be trusted.’ Hoskyns, Just in Time, p. 325. 
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challenge to orthodoxy that came from the Policy Unit to be 
‘electrifying’49 and was himself, in 1981 to take a secondment to that 
quintessentially 1980s merchant bank: S.G. Warburg. 
 
Commentators often presented the Thatcher government as pitching 
radical ministers against cautious civil servants – one thinks of Sir 
Humphrey Appleby in the 1980s-television series Yes Minister who 
can think of no more damning comment than that a proposal is ‘bold.’  
However, it was politicians not civil servants who had most reason to 
feel nervous about facing down the miners. Making the wrong move 
could bring political disaster, as Heath had learned in 1974. Not 
surprisingly, it was often ministers, and especially the Prime 
Minister, who backed away from confrontation. Civil servants, by 
contrast, could afford to think over a longer term and had less reason 
to fear political consequences.  Robert Wade-Gery had returned to 
the Foreign Office and been posted as ambassador to Delhi before the 
strike began. He recalled: 
 
When it actually happened, I was sitting in India, simply 
listening to the radio, and fascinated to see that they followed 
the plans almost to the letter. In a way, I suppose, I had the best 
of it. I didn’t have the anxieties of actually going through the 
strike itself. I had all the stimulus of making the plans.50 
 
Officials approached the task of preparing for a miners’ strike with 
particular relish, different from the dutiful resignation with which 
they implemented, say, government policy on controlling the money 
supply.51 Indeed, they sometimes urged action on reluctant ministers. 
Sir John Herbecq, of the Treasury, recalled:  
 
In July 1979, Christopher Foster ... and I were having private 
meetings with one or two other outsiders and Michael Portillo 
(who was special adviser to David Howell at the Department of 
Energy) about a miners’ strike.  It actually took until the scare of 
the spring of 1981 to get the government to grapple with 
 
49Hoskyns, Just in Time, p. 184. 
50BDHOP, Wade-Gery interview. 
51Lawson described Douglas Wass, of the treasury, as a ‘non-believing 
monetarist’. The View from No 11, p. 45. 
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preparing for a miners’ strike, which conservatively we 
reckoned would take two years.’52 
 
 
Peter le Cheminant, an official from the Department of Energy 
attached to the Cabinet Office, urged the government to take on the 
miners in February 1981. He recognized that doing so might be an 
intrusion ‘into the substance, as opposed to the handling of policy 
issues’ and he expressed himself in vivid terms: ‘[I]f there has to be 
blood-letting in the mining industry the present timing and issue are 
the best the government could have hoped for.’53  
 
Civil servants may simply have shared the general distaste for trade 
union power that was felt by much of the upper middle class in the 
early 1980s, but some of them had special reason to feel concerned 
about the power of the National Union of Mineworkers. Many had 
served Edward Heath in the early 1970s and had felt particularly 
engaged by Heath’s style of government. For them, the power cuts of 
1972, which had left officials drafting documents by candlelight, were 
more than the result of an ordinary strike and the ‘who governs 
Britain election’ of 1974, which brought Heath down, was more than 
just the defeat of a political party.  Both reflected a crisis of the state.  
William Armstrong had been Cabinet Secretary in 1974 and had 
suffered a nervous breakdown during the miners’ strike.  The fact 
that he had given evidence to a secret Conservative committee in the 
1970s reflects the extent to which thinking by officials and thinking 
by the Conservative party had moved in parallel during the 1970s.54  
Peter Gregson, who succeeded Wade-Gery as chair of MISC 57, had 
been a private secretary to Heath and felt ‘deep depression’ at the 
defeat that the miners had inflicted on Heath in 1972.55 
 
Robert Armstrong (no relation to William), had been Heath’s 
Principal Private Secretary and, with tears in his eyes, accompanied 
 
52Sir John Herbecq, ‘The Civil Service Reforms of the 1980s: the 1981 Civil Service 
Strike’, seminar held 17 November 2006, Centre for Contemporary British History, 
http://icbh.a.uk/downloads/civilservicereforms,  p. 40. In his unpublished memoirs, 
Herbecq says ‘it took a massive direct challenge from the miners to provoke firm 
action against union militancy’. Cambridge Churchill College Archive Centre, 
Herbecq Manuscript, p. 275.  
53TFW 126037, Le Cheminant to Robert Armstrong, 17 February 1981. 
54TFW 111390, Authority of Government Group, 21 July 1976. 
55Moore, Everything she Wants, p. 143.  
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Heath to present his resignation as Prime Minister.56  Robert 
Armstrong became Cabinet Secretary in 1979 and head of the home 
civil service, when the civil service department was abolished, in 
1981. Partly because of his links with Heath, Thatcherites felt 
uncomfortable about Armstrong – both Hoskyns and Mount cited 
him as the incarnation of everything that they disliked about 
Whitehall - and Armstrong was sceptical about some government 
projects, such as the banning of trade unions at the Government 
Central Communications Headquarters. On one issue, however, 
Armstrong differed little from the most hawkish ministers. He wrote 
in June 1981: ‘There are few more important questions for the 





There are two big general questions to be asked about government 
attitudes to the prospect of a coal strike. The first of these is: how 
much did they know about the NUM or, for that matter, about the 
NCB? The security service reports provided details about the political 
opinions of members of the National Executive of the NUM.  The 
government understood that there was not always a clear-cut 
division between ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists’ in the NUM leadership 
and that Communists, in particular, might sometimes be a force for 
restraint, though not always an effective one. A civil servant in the 
Department of Employment wrote in 1981:  
 
The NUM think of a Conservative government as a natural 
enemy and believe that the Tory party has scores to settle ...  
This make its members particularly paranoid and partly 
explains why, in February, the S Wales delegate conference 
overturned the measured strategy of its Communist 
leadership.58  
 
The results of successive ballots on strikes gave ministers and their 
advisors a sense of the political geography of the miners. They knew 
that the NUM was not a homogeneous and that its federal structure 
 
56TFW 110605, Robert Armstrong, ‘Events leading to the resignation of Mr 
Heath’s administration on 4 March 1974: note for the record’, 16 March 1974.   
57TNA CAB 184/527/1, Armstrong to Hoksyns, 2 June 1981. 
58TNA CAB 184/527/2, Douglas Smith ‘The NCB/NUM Problem: a Definition’, 
undated but obviously July 1981. 
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gave great power to regional leaders. They also appreciated that 
productivity varied sharply from area to area and that miners might 
have different economic interests. In April 1981, the civil servant 
Andrew Duguid recognized the benefits if ‘men in different regions 
came to see their regional self-interest as differing from the interests 
of miners in other regions.’59 However, Duguid recognized that 
effecting this would be a long-term project, and one that would 
require high wages for miners in the most productive regions. The 
CPRS report of 1981 on the ‘NCB/NUM problem’ said that breaking 
up the National Coal Board into regional components  would risk 
weakening management while leaving the union intact. The only way 
to ‘split the NUM…would be to form, or bring in, another union. We 
do not believe this is a serious possibility.’60 No one, on the 
government side, envisaged the divisions among miners that would 
emerge in 1984/5. 
 
What the government lacked was much sense of grass roots opinion 
in the coal fields or of the way in which that opinion might be 
changed by new pay structures, threats to jobs or general social 
change. Reports to ministers described the miners as being marked 
by high levels of solidarity – such reports, in fact, had something in 
common with the sentimentality about miners that was shown by 
much of the left. The CPRS report of 1981 noted: ‘Part of the NUM’s 
strength in industrial disputes rests on the isolation of many 
members in small communities wholly dependent on the mining 
industry.’61  It recognized that mining communities were changing 
but described these changes as ‘long-term and marginal influences.’  
The report also recognized that much information available to the 
government was ‘anecdotal’ and called for more systematic research 
into the opinion of miners,62 though this research seems never to 
have been done. It was symptomatic of the dependence on anecdotal 
information that Bernard Ingham – the Prime Minister’s press 
secretary and a man who derived his knowledge of the matter from 
his own roots in Yorkshire and, perhaps, from his experience as a 
journalist specializing in industrial relations – predicted the result of 
 
59TFW 126059, Duguid to Lankester, 2 April 1981. 
60TFW 135946, CPRS report ‘NCB/NUM problem’, though dated on the Thatcher 
Foundation website to March 1982, this report seems, in fact, to have been 




the miners’ ballot of early 1982 better than did the Secretary of State 
for Energy.63 
 
The government and its advisers often talked of the NCB and NUM as 
though they were a single entity and, in practice, their knowledge of 
the Coal Board was not always much better than the knowledge of 
the union. They had some inside information. Jennifer Youde had 
worked for the Board from 1977 until her secondment to the CPRS in 
1981 – though her comments on the matter seem mainly to have 
related to the NUM rather than her former employer. Malcolm 
Edwards, the marketing director of the NCB, held a secret meeting 
with Ian Gow, Thatcher’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, in 
September 1982. Given that Thatcher’s ministers so often blamed the 
Coal Board for appeasing the miners, it is interesting that Edwards 
urged the government to stand firm on miners’ pay in the hope that 
this might make it easier to protect the industry as a whole. He 
sought to stiffen ministerial resolve on this issue because he worried 
that ‘the government’s fear of the NUM will lead to a mounting cost 
for coal that will make its long term competitive position completely 
untenable.’ He added that if the Coal Board were left free to ‘develop 
a tough line it will carry conviction with the workers who are a very 
different proposition from the period ten years ago which he thinks 
still obsesses your colleagues.’64   
 
Ministers paid relatively little attention to the regional element of the 
NCB. They tended to see the Coal Board as a centralized body – 
sometimes referring to it by the name of its London headquarters at 
Hobbart House – and they assumed that the key question about the 
Board was simply who should be its chair. They did not have much 
sense that area directors of the NCB were already conducting 
different kinds of policies with regard to labour relations. They did 
not comment, for example on the differences between the policy of 
the area director in Wales, relatively close to the NUM,65 and his 
colleague in Scotland, who had a more aggressive management 
 
63Lawson had predicted that 60% of miners would vote for a strike. See TFW 
135925, Scholar to Hallyday, 13 Jan. 1982. Ingham predicted, correctly, that they 
would not, TFW 135929, Ingham to Scholar, 15 Jan. 1982 
64TFW 151101, Harris to Gow, 21 Sept. 1982. 
65Ministers followed the action of Weekes (the South Wales area director) as he 
confronted the threat of a strike over pit closures in February but their 
exchanges do not comment on his relatively close relations with the NUM. See 
TFW 138752,  Moore to Howe, 22 Feb. 1983. 
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style.66 The Area Director for South Yorkshire was less assured than 
most of his colleagues and provided the spark for the 1984 strike 
partly by seeking to close the Cortonwood pit without the normal 
process, but he seems to have attracted no attention from 
government until after the strike had begun, when ministers were 
forced to explain his actions to questioning Labour MPs. 67 
 
The second big question with regard to a possible miners’ strike is: 
how did the miners fit into the attitude of the government towards 
unions in general?  Ministers had denounced ‘over-mighty’ unions 
during the 1979 election, and they brought forward laws in 1980 and 
1982 to limit union power. These laws provoked division in the 
Cabinet (largely about the speed rather than direction of travel) that 
made the chairman of the party worry about the prospect of 
ministerial resignations.68 However, policy towards the miners was, 
to a large extent, treated separately from other questions regarding 
trade unions. The government understood that the NUM might ally 
with other trade unions – particularly the steel workers and the 
railway men, with whom the NUM formed the ‘triple alliance’. 
Ministers and their advisors also believed that the miners were ‘pace 
setters’ for pay negotiations in other industries, but both these things 
became less important as time went on.  Alliance with other trade 
unions became less likely after Arthur Scargill replaced Joe Gormley 
as leader of the NUM in 1982 (see below) and increasingly the 
radicalism of miners was seen to be focused around the prospect of 
pit closures rather than pay.  Under these circumstances, the NUM 
was less likely to be seen as the leading element of working class 
militancy and more likely to be seen as a free-standing problem.   A 
number of studies were commissioned into the prospect of 
‘withstanding strikes’ in key sectors,69 but the NUM received more 
sustained attention than any other union. A miners’ strike was a 
more frightening prospect than a strike in other sectors – a steel 
strike had passed off with relatively little political damage in 1980. 
Indeed, the government was often keen to separate the miners from 
other workers and, for this reason, was generous, in the run up to the 
strike, in its treatment of railway men, steel workers and electricians 
 
66 David Howell, ‘Defiant Dominoes: Working Miners and the 1984-5 Strike’ in 
Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (eds),  Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge,  
2012), pp. 148-164. 
67TFW 133334, Walker to Lawson, 11 May 1984. 
68TFW 151134, note by Richard Ryder 12 Feb. 1980. 
69TFW 137978, Armstrong to Thatcher, 4 May 1982.  
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who might have allied with the miners, or whose support was 
necessary to keep power stations open during a coal strike. 
 
When it came to the miners, the government had little faith in the 
efficacy of its own legislation. In 1981, the CPRS believed that  
such measures [new labour laws] might play a useful role in 
dissuading other unions, e.g. NUR, from sympathetic activity; but 
they are not likely to have any great impact on miners’ action. 
They would not cope with intimidatory mass picketing as seen at 
Saltley Coke Deport in 1972 … where the problem is one of 
enforceability rather than what the law permits.70   
 
The 1983 Conservative manifesto raised the possibility of new laws 
to restrict strikes in ‘essential services’.  Ministers and their advisors 
discussed these proposals for the next few months, and were still 
discussing them as the miners’ strike began.  However, most felt that 
including miners in the list of those to be regulated would be a 
mistake, 71 and that approaches that did not involve a change in the 
law – notably building up coal stocks – would be more effective.72 
Some ministers did propose the use of new union laws during the 
strike of 1984/1985 but, in effect, this option had been ruled out on 






In September 1981, Nigel Lawson replaced David Howell as 
Secretary of State for Energy.  Many of Lawson’s former colleagues  
were later to give him the credit for the defeat of the NUM.73 In his 
autobiography Lawson claims that Thatcher herself told him, on his 
appointment, ‘We mustn’t have a coal strike’.74  He presents himself 
as more resolute: ‘on the coal front, I subordinated almost everything 
 
70TFW 135946, CPRS report ‘NCB/NUM problem’, though dated on the Thatcher 
Foundation website to March 1982, this report seems, in fact, to have been 
finished on 31 July 1981. See similar wording in TNA CAB 184/527/2, Mackenzie 
to Ibbs, 14 July 1981. 
71TFW 134194, Mount to Thatcher, 14 Nov. 1983 
72TFW 134193, Gregson to Thatcher,11 Nov. 1983. 
73See, for example, Heseltine’s view in Hugo Young, The Hugo Young Papers: 
Thirty Years of British Politics of the Record (2008), p. 281.  
74Lawson, The View from No. 11, p. 140. 
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to the need to prepare for and win a strike. It was not that I was 
seeking one. But it was clear Arthur Scargill was, and I was 
determined that he should lose it when it came’.75 
 
In some ways, Lawson’s position as Secretary of State for Energy 
involved a reversal of the one that he had taken in his previous 
position as Financial Secretary to the Treasury. Until he took the 
Energy portfolio, he had been mainly concerned, like all Treasury 
ministers, to reduce the amount of public money spent by the NCB 
and to introduce competition into the industry.  Now the measures 
that he took to avoid, deter or win a strike often involved spending 
money and, at least in the short term, impeding competition. To avoid 
provoking the miners, and against the opposition of the Treasury, he 
sought to limit coal imports, and asked that that the Central 
Electricity Generating Board should be compensated for agreeing to 
do so.76 In addition to this, he turned away from structural reforms of 
the coal industry – notably the privatization of open cast mining – 
that had been discussed as means to break the monopoly power of 
the NCB. 77   This brought him into conflict with John Vereker, one of 
the civil servants attached to the Policy Unit, who argued that: ‘the 
only long-term measure for dealing with the NUM monopoly is to get 
rid of the monopoly.78 A year later Nicholas Owen, also a civil servant 
and Vereker’s successor at the Policy Unit, was equally blunt:  
 
The draft objectives for the NCB which Mr Lawson has just 
circulated are not satisfactory as they stand ….. long term 
profitability should be specified more precisely… particularly in 
regard to the timescale within which the NCB should bring its 
capacity into line with profitable sales.79 
 
Lawson continued and accelerated the build-up of coal and other 
materials at power stations. In April 1982, to help this along, he 
replaced the head of the Central Electricity Generating Board, Glyn 
England, with Walter Marshall. Marshal, a former head of the Atomic 
Energy Authority and champion of nuclear power, was more 
sympathetic to the government but less interested in the 
government’s ostensible aim of making nationalized industries 
 
75Ibid. p. 143. 
76TFW 138726 Brittan to Lawson, 14 Feb. 1983. 
77TFW 136134, Vereker to Scholar, 11 March 1982.   
78TFW 135952, ibid., 2 June 1982.   
79TFW 138759, Owen to Scholar, 17 March 1983. 
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function according to commercial logic and, consequently, more 
willing to accept the high cost of storing coal at power stations. 
Lawson also cultivated leaders of trade unions, notably Frank 
Chapple of the electricians, who might have been in a position to help 
the miners during a strike.80 
 
Lawson sought to exploit the ‘political geography’ of the coalfields.  In 
the ballot of January 1982, miners from Scotland, Wales and part of 
the North had voted in favour of a strike. Almost three quarters of 
those from the Midlands had voted against: ‘Part of any strategy for 
coal must be to maintain, and if possible, to increase their relative 
importance [i.e. that of miners in the Midlands] in the overall picture, 
by ensuring that the necessary run down in the industry occurs less 
rapidly there than elsewhere.’81 To gain the continued acquiescence 
of miners from the Midlands, Lawson, himself a Leicestershire MP, 
conducted delicate negotiations to ensure that, against the wishes of 
many local Tories, a new coal field in Belvoir in Leicestershire was 
exploited.82 
 
There were two keynotes to everything that Lawson did. The first 
was discretion.  His public statements, and even his written 
exchanges with fellow ministers, were anodyne but he gave a more 
robust brief to directors of the Coal Board and oral instructions to the 
chairman of the board. 83 The second keynote was flexibility. Lawson 
sought to keep the widest possible room for manoeuvre. He 
dissuaded the Prime Minister from saying in December 1981 that a 
strike could not be contemplated at all in the following year,84 but 
refusing to rule out a strike did not mean that he wanted one. A 
month later, as the miners voted on a proposal to authorize a strike, 
he wrote: ‘Despite Sir Derek Ezra’s  [the chairman of Coal Board] 
request for clear guidance now, I am sure we should not try to reach 
final decisions until after we know the outcome of the ballot’.85   
  
 
80Lawson, The View from No. 11, p. 148. 
81TFW 122730, Lawson, ‘The Politics of Belvoir’, attached to note to Ian Gow, 27 
Jan. 1982. 
82TFW 138310, Lawson to Thatcher, 16 Sept. 1981. 
83TFW 135954, West to Scholar, 10 June 1981 and TFW 135956, Scholar to West, 
14 June 1982. 
84Hoskyns, Just in Time, p. 361. 
85TFW 135923, Lawson to Thatcher, 8 Jan. 1982.  
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Timing mattered.  Though Lawson did not rule anything out, he 
wanted to avoid confrontation with the miners before the 
government was ready. Equally, however, there was no point in very 
long-term projects, such as the conversion of power stations to use 
oil as well as coal, which would ‘come to fruition beyond the 
timescale within which we were likely to be faced with a strike.’86 
Lawson seems to have calculated that a miners’ strike was most 
likely to come in the medium term.  Increasing coal stocks would take 
some time to take effect but it could not go on for ever. In April 1982, 
Lawson anticipated that coal stocks might be reduced ‘once two 
autumns have passed’ – i.e. in spring 1984.87  
 
The fact that Lawson’s approach was, in the short-term, so tentative 
may have been influenced by the fact that his tenure at Energy 
coincided with an interregnum on both sides of the coal industry. The 
government blamed Derek Ezra, who had been Chairman of the Coal 
Board since 1971, for complicity with the NUM and Lawson did not 
renew Ezra’s contract in 1982 – an ungracious move in view of the 
fact that Lawson had actually rejected Ezra’s desire to take a firm line 
with the NUM at the beginning of that year. 88  Instead he appointed 
Ian MacGregor. MacGregor had been chairman of British Steel and 
had helped to turn it into a more commercial entity, preparing the 
way for its privatization in 1988.  Revealingly, a civil servant had 
written in July 1981 ‘One cannot yet do a MacGregor on the coal 
industry.’89 However, MacGregor could not take over immediately 
and Norman Siddall – another Coal Board manager - stood in for a 
year; he could not serve for longer because he was in poor health.  
Lawson approved of Siddall, who was less emollient than Ezra but 
more subtle than MacGregor and who managed to close twenty pits 
during his brief tenure without causing a strike.   
 
There was also a parenthesis at the NUM.  Its president, Joe Gormley, 
was due to retire in 1982. Gormley had led successful strikes in 1972 
and 1974, but he preferred to achieve concessions without strikes if 
possible, which was what he had done in 1981. For years, it had been 
expected that the left-wing leader of the South Yorkshire miners, 
Arthur Scargill, would succeed Gormley. Scargill had long featured in 
Conservative demonology. Lawson had written to Geoffrey Howe as 
 
86Lawson, The View from No. 11, p. 151. 
87TFW 135951, Vereker to Scholar, 2 April 1982.  
88TFW 135923, Lawson to Thatcher, 8 Jan. 1982.  
89TNA CAB 184/527/2, Turner to Beauman, 23 July 1981 
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early as July 1981: ‘The problem is essentially a political one, 
centring around industrial relations in general and outmaneouvring 
Arthur Scargill in particular.’90 
 
In the short term, Scargill’s looming presence had curious effects.  
Ministers understood that divisions in the NUM were complicated 
and that ‘the maverick right’ might seek to prove their toughness in 
order to compete with Scargill, 91 but they made concessions to 
Gormley because they hoped to shore up his position and that of 
‘moderates’ against Scargill and the ‘extremists’. This partly underlay 
the climb down of February 1981.’92 The Prime Minister herself 
believed that ‘the NCB would have to go along, to a large extent, with 
whatever Mr Gormley proposed in order to ensure that the militants 
did not regain their ascendency.’93  Even after the government climb 
down, Howell, the Secretary of State for Energy, asked what might be 
done to ‘keep the temperature down so as to strengthen further 
Gormley’s position and to frustrate Scargill?’94   
 
The early part of Lawson’s time at the Department of Energy 
coincided with a period during which the Scargill succession had 
become all but certain (his formal election came in December 1981) 
but during which Gormley remained leader of the union: he did not 
step down until March 1982. Gormley openly opposed his successor, 
calling for miners not to strike when they were balloted on the 
matter in early 1982.  Lawson and Gormley were surprisingly close – 
perhaps it was easier for a Thatcherite to deal with the leader of the 
1973/1974 strike than it would have been for a Heathite to do so – 
and it was Lawson who secured Gormley a peerage.  The two men 
also had, at least in the short term, some interests in common.  Both 
wanted to avoid an immediate strike, and both wanted the CEGB to 
buy large amounts of British coal – though one assumes that Gormley 
did not share Lawson’s understanding that coal stocks might one day 
be used to increase endurance during a strike. 
 
 Scargill was more aggressive than Gormley,  and, in some ways, this 
simplified the government’s position. Complicated debates about 
 
90Lawson, The View from No. 11, p.142. 
91TFW 126500, Lawson to Howe, 13 Nov. 1981. 
92TFW 126047, Howell to Thatcher, 25 Feb. 1981.  
93TFW 126045, Record of conversation Thatcher, Howell, Moore, Maitland and 
Monger, 20 Feb. 1981.  
94TFW 126086, Howell to Thatcher, 18 June 1981. 
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long-term planning and about whether the government was seeking 
to survive a strike or deter one mattered less once it was clear that 
the leader of the NUM was determined to lead a strike.  Scargill was 
also, unlike Gormley, unpopular outside his own union. The effect of 
Scargill’s accession was not, however, immediate – partly because he 
failed to get the required majority for a strike in ballots 1982 and 
1983. 
 
Most importantly, preparations for a miners’ strike were associated 
with the electoral cycle.  The coincidence of a miners’ strike and 
general election had proved fatal to Edward Heath.  Officials 
recognized that the approach of an election towards the end of the 
first Thatcher government would make it increasingly difficult to 
take on the miners.95  Correspondingly, though, a government which 
had just won an election – particularly one with the large majority of 
1983 – was in a strong position to confront a miners’ strike. In 
January 1983, Lawson, writing to the Prime Minister, suggested that, 
for the time being, the NCB should ‘pursue the fastest programme of 
closures which is consistent …with the probable avoidance of a 
strike’, but he added that a more aggressive policy would be possible 
in the future: ‘However, the time to embark on it is as soon as 
possible after an election, and not in the year immediately preceding 
one.’96 
 
Perhaps Lawson had more personal reasons for wishing to avoid 
confronting the miners before an election – especially if, as seems 
likely, he guessed that he was to be promoted after it.  He was still a 
junior member of the Cabinet and one who owed his rise to 
Thatcher’s personal favour. In 1981, Thatcher had illustrated her 
capacity for blaming other people if things went wrong.  Being the 
minster charged with managing a miners’ strike would have entailed 




After the 1983 election, Lawson became Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
He was replaced at the Department of Energy by Peter Walker. 
 
95TFW 135916, Wade-Gery to Thatcher, 16 Dec. 1981.  He suggested that an 
advantage of a strike that winter rather than the following one lay in the fact that 
‘parliament’s life is further from its natural end.’  See also TNA CAB 184/527/2, 
Turner to Beaumont 13 July 1981. 
96TFW 138768, Lawson to Thatcher, 21 Jan. 1983. 
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Walker had been close to Heath and was not a natural ally of 
Thatcher. Walker regarded his appointment as a demotion, having 
previously been Minister of Agriculture, and only accepted it because 
Thatcher told him that she needed a minister to take on Arthur 
Scargill.  
 
Whereas energy had been Lawson’s first Cabinet office and the 
beginning of a brilliant career, Walker’s best days were clearly 
behind him: 97 he had nothing to lose. Walker was also – beneath the 
soft voice – more ruthless than Lawson. Indeed Lawson, who had lost 
money through unwise investments, had written ruefully in the 
1970s about the fear aroused by Walker’s activities as an asset-
stripping businessman.98  Walker was, in short, a front-line 
commander – calm under fire.  Lawson had been a staff officer – a 
good man to prepare the ground but one whose patrician accent, 
brusque manner and impulsiveness might have been awkward in a 
strike. 
 
Did Thatcher appreciate that a strike was imminent when she 
appointed Walker?  The brief notes that survive suggest that 
relatively little attention was given to the appointment. The head of 
Thatcher’s political office wrote to her about ministerial 
appointments in June 1983:  
 
If you feel you can’t ditch Peter Walker, who has done a good 
job, Energy is one of the few places he could go. He is shrewd, 
and is unlikely to misjudge the industrial relations situation.  
You might need occasionally to toughen him up, but that is 
better than having an optimist at energy who doesn’t see trouble 
coming!99 
 
It may be that Walker’s appointment was almost accidental but that 




97Churchill, Hoskyns 2/296, ‘Cabinet Reshuffle’, 21 March 1981. Hoskyns 
proposed sacking Walker. 
98TFW 110312, Lawson, ‘Thoughts on the Coming Battle’, 15 Oct. 1973 – attached 
to memorandum on ‘Stepping Stones’, 15 Jan. 1978. 
99TFW 131085, Wolfson to Thatcher, 10 June 1983. 
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Understanding Walker’s motives is hard because, partly to maintain 
secrecy, he committed little to paper. 100  The flood of reports on a 
potential miners’ strike dried up. To the exasperation of civil 
servants, Walker refused to give colleagues a document on his policy 
towards the miners.101 There was no ministerial discussion of pit 
closures between September 1983 and January 1984,102 and, when a 
discussion did take place, Walker briefed ministers orally and only 
gave a written account to the Prime Minister herself. 103  
 
Ian MacGregor, who had been appointed during Lawson’s time at the 
Department of Energy, did not take up his post as chairman of the 
Coal Board until September 1983, by which time Walker had 
succeeded Lawson.  MacGregor considered himself close to Thatcher, 
which did not endear him to Walker. There was also a difference of 
style.  MacGregor was much given to claims about what he could and 
would do. This meant that, in private meetings, he gave figures for 
the numbers of pits that could be closed – though he gave different 
figures at different times and does not, in fact, seem to have had a 
consistent plan.104  Walker, by contrast, avoided promises until he 
was certain that he could honour them.   
 
Did the ministers know how many pits they wanted to close?  The 
honest answer would probably have been ‘as many as we can get 
away with.’ Insiders understood that the government had long-term 
ambitions to reduce coal production that went beyond anything that 
had been admitted in public. John Vereker noted that one of his 
colleagues from the Department of Energy regarded a strike over pay 
as more likely than one over closures. He added, drily, ‘This may of 
 
100TFW 133118, Gregson to Scholar, 8 Sept. 1983 ‘The Secretary of State… may be 
reluctant to do this [to circulate a paper] because of the extreme sensitivity of 
the subject and the Prime Minister will no doubt have similar anxieties.’ 
Someone, perhaps Thatcher herself, underlined ‘sensitivity’ and wrote ‘NO’ by a 
suggestion that a paper might be given limited circulation. 
101Ibid: ‘it would be desirable to place a very firm obligation on the Secretary of 
State for Energy to come forward with his views on closures strategy not later 
than mid-October. It would also be desirable to get something on paper so that 
the Ministers primarily concerned can think about the matter’. 
102TFW 133133, Gregson to Thatcher, 18 Jan. 1984. 
103TFW 133131, ‘NCB Manpower’, ‘Note for the Record’, Turnbull, 12 Jan. 1984 
104In Sept. 1983, MacGregor anticipated the closure of 75 pits and the loss of 
55,000 jobs, TFW 133121, record of meeting at Downing Street, 15 Sept. 1983.  
In Jan. 1984, he anticipated the loss of 45,000 jobs. TFW 133712, ‘Coal Policy’, 19 
Jan. 1984.  
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course simply reflect that he has more modest assumptions than we 
about the likely extent of closures.’105 
 
Underneath Walker’s veil of silence, outlines of government policy 
can be discerned.  First, some officials began to challenge the 
assumption, which had pervaded the first Thatcher government, that 
decisions on coal could not be taken on the basis of conventional 
business logic and that dealing with the miners would require large 
expenditure – either to buy off the miners, to deter a strike or to 
endure one. A civil servant wrote to the Prime Minister in September 
1983 that the NCB would be bankrupt if it was a private company. He 
did not share the view, which had often been expressed by ministers, 
that miners needed to be paid well in order to buy their acquiescence 
in pit closures:  ‘Firmness on pay surely goes hand in hand with 
firmness on pit closures. The logic of the market says that if an 
employer needs fewer employees he needs only offer lower or no 
increases in pay.’106  Thatcher’s private secretary said that his ‘new 
year’s resolution’ for 1984 was to persuade the Prime Minister to 
stop the CEGB from buying coal above market prices.107 This implied 
a break with measures that had been taken to appease the miners in 
February 1981. It also implied unease about the cost of the large coal 
stocks that had been accumulated as ‘insurance’ against a miners’ 
strike and, perhaps, the feeling that it was time to cash in this policy. 
It was noted at a meeting convoked by the prime minster in 
November 1983 that ‘increasing endurance would run into 
diminishing returns.’108  Stocks by this stage were, in fact, so high that 
officials did not worry about the overtime ban that the NUM 
instituted in late 1983.109 One wrote: ‘I regard any further extension 
of power station stocks as unlikely to change appreciably the risks of 
the NUM striking. And I believe the benefit of high stocks consists 
more in its deterrent value than in the extension of actual endurance 
once a strike has broken out.’110 
 
The very fact that Walker was so reluctant to circulate written plans 
suggests that he knew that he was moving towards (though not 
 
105TFW 138793, Vereker to Mount, 22 Feb. 1983. 
106TFW 133120, Owen to Thatcher, 14 Sept. 1983.   
107 TFW 133132, Turnbull to Thatcher, 18 Jan. 1984.  
108133128, record of conversation, Thatcher, Walker, Lawson, Gregson, 2 Nov. 
1983. 
109TFW 133129, Turnbull to Thatcher, 1 Dec. 1983. 
110TNA EG 26/36 Priddle to Metz, 18 Oct. 1983. 
 29 
necessarily seeking) confrontation with the NUM. The new mood 
went with an increasingly hard-headed approach. Walker turned 
away from the abstract, almost academic, tone in which a miners’ 
strike had previously been discussed. The word ‘strategy’ had been 
used almost obsessively in earlier discussions of the miners. Walker, 
by contrast, emphasized tactics. Some of those who had been 
involved in the discussions of the previous Thatcher government 
resented this.  Lawson wrote in July 1983 that: ‘Officials should be 
asked to refine the endurance options when we have decided our 
strategic approach.111 Peter Gregson, of the Cabinet office, regretted 
the absence of an ‘agreed, explicit strategy for closures’ but conceded 
that   
 
The discussion could start from the commonsense assumption 
(unrelated to any particular strategy) that it would be prudent 
to plan for a strike occurring at any time over the next three 
years or so and that we ought to concentrate on options which 
might yield some benefit within that timescale, rather than the 
longer term options.112  
 
In some respects, the turn from strategy to tactics fitted with broader 
changes in government style. Hoskyns, the most enthusiastic 
proponent of ‘strategy’, had left Downing Street in April 1982.  As for 
the CPRS, closely involved in policy to the Coal Industry since the 
Heath government and the source of the longest report on the 
NCB/NUM problem in the early 1980s, it was simply abolished after 
the 1983 election. Its demise owed something to Thatcher’s sense 
that its reports had been ‘too general … she found it difficult to derive 
specific points for practical action from them.’113 By late 1982, 
government thinking had changed. There was less interest in long-
term solutions – such as the cultivation of alternative energy sources 
- to the problems posed by the miners. 114 The large majority of the 
1983 election brought more emphasis on immediate action. 
  
From the 1983 election, government attention was increasingly 
focused on the simple question of how it would survive a strike in the 
short term and all other questions were discarded. Ahead of a 
 
111TFW 133115, Lawson to Thatcher, 28 July 1983 
112TFW 133122, Gregson to Scholar, 21 Sept. 1983.  
113TNA PREM 19/1045, note of meeting between Armstrong and Sparrow, 30 
Nov. 1982. 
114TFW 133126, note by Turnbull, 28 Oct. 1983. 
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meeting with ministers, Thatcher agreed with civil servants that: ‘Mr 
Walker should be invited to give only the barest background on 
closures, merely indicating that there was a real risk of a strike in the 
next two years.’115 At the meeting itself, the Prime Minister summed 
up the conversation by saying that: ‘the first priority should be to 
concentrate on measures which would bring benefit within the next 
year or so.’116 
 
Even after the 1983 election and Walker’s appointment, however, 
ministers did not choreograph events. A civil servant summed up the 
mood in September 1983. He said that a strike over pit closures was 
more likely than one over pay and that ‘there would be a better 
prospect of withstanding it than in the past.’  He thought that there 
was only modest scope for extending endurance by November 1984 
and concluded:  
 
[T]his analysis suggests that there is no case for making a special 
effort to avoid a miners’ strike this year in particular, or for 
adopting a weak line in the pay negotiations because of fears of a 
strike. On the other hand it would probably not be sensible for the 
NCB to go out of their way to provoke a strike.117  
 
On 7 March 1984, Thatcher herself told a meeting simply ‘the 
position was substantially different to that in 1981.’118  
 
Most importantly, the government had not anticipated the particular 
kind of strike that they faced in 1984/5.  It was  much longer than 
they had expected. Much of their planning revolved around a 
comparatively short strike after which both sides would retire to lick 
their wounds. Some ministers had thought it possible that there 
would be two strikes in 1982.119  By 1984, increased coal stocks 
made it possible to endure a strike for longer than ever before, but 
planners still talked of an endurance of not much more than six 
months.  An official at the Department of Energy wrote in October 
 
115TFW 133127, record of conversation, Thatcher, Armstrong, Gregson, 31 Oct. 
1983. 
116TFW 133128, record of conversation, Thatcher, Walker, Lawson, Gregson, 2 
Nov. 1983. 
117TFW 133119, Gregson to Thatcher, 14 Sept. 1983.   
118TFW 133168, Minutes of Cabinet, 8 March 1984.   
119TFW 135926, Vereker to Scholar, 13 Jan. 1982. Ministers did not rule out the 
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1983: ‘The NCB and the Government would wish to settle a strike 
within a few weeks to avoid a legacy of bitterness which could 
prejudice the future success of the coal industry.’120 Officials would 
hardly have regarded a strike beginning in the spring as so 
advantageous if they had realized that it would last for a year. 
 
Furthermore, for most of the period that they were preparing for a 
strike, most on the government side imagined that it would begin 
after a ballot.121 The government also expected that the order to 
strike would be observed by all miners and that men would only 
return to work when the union executive ordered them to do so.122 
Ministers had worked to ‘decentralize’ mining and to emphasize the 
prosperous future of the Midlands coal field, but they had done so 
because they hoped that Nottingham miners would oppose a strike in 
a ballot.123  They do not seem to have anticipated that there would be 
no ballot and that a substantial proportion of miners would stay at 
work or that the union would ultimately split.  A civil servant wrote, 
days before the first miners walked out: 
 
[A]national strike could not begin without a national ballot and 
there has been no talk of this so far. The indications are that the 
union wish to avoid the test of a national ballot which they are 
not confident they could  win. It is likely that their preferred 
strategy will be to encourage local action.124   
 
The split in the miners’ union meant that the government could hold 
out for longer. It also changed priorities in other ways. Much pre-
 
120TNA EG 26/36 Priddle to Metz, 18 Oct. 1983. 
121Ministers knew that Scargill might try to circumvent the electoral rules of his 
union by supporting an action that began at local level but did not think his 
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Howe, 21 Dec. 1982.  
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123TFW 122730, Lawson, ‘The Politics of Belvoir’, attached to note to Ian Gow, 27 
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strike planning had revolved around the need to maintain large 
stocks at power stations rather than at pits. However, as it turned 
out, much of the coal that the Electricity Board burnt during strikes 
was not only at pits at the start of the strike but was, in fact, 
underground.  Now the key was not coal stocks in themselves but 
effective policing, which would prevent pickets from closing pits or 
impeding the movement of coal. Policing had always played a role in 
planning for a strike but few had anticipated the huge importance 
that it would assume. A civil servant, reflecting after the strike, told 
the Prime Minister: ‘The key point was probably right at the start on 
Wednesday 14 March [i.e. after the strike had begun]  … you 
galvanized the Home Secretary, who in turn galvanized the police 
into keeping the entrances to the pits open.’125  
 
The government had anticipated and prepared for a strike. Ministers 
knew that the spring of 1984 was probably the least bad time to face 
one and they were no longer making assiduous efforts to avoid 
confrontation.  However, for all their preparations, they were still 
uncomfortable when the strike began.  They knew that dealing with a 
strike was a complicated operation and that plans for such 
operations often went wrong. Even in 1984, there was no certainty 
that the government would win and there were moments during the 
strike – when it seemed likely that dockers or colliery overseers 
would strike – that caused them alarm.   
 
Shortly after the strike, Thatcher’s private secretary commented on a 
secret report thus:  
 
[It] tends to present the strike as a uni-directional struggle in 
which the Government gradually overpowered the miners. It 
does not convey the fluctuating fortunes and how near, on 
occasions, the Government came to disaster … the outcome did 





What general points about the Thatcher government can be derived 
from the study of preparation for the miners’ strike?  The first is that 
 
125TFW 136462, Turnbull to Thatcher, 24 May 1985.  
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even the extensive archives that have now been released with regard 
to this episode do not tell us everything.  They reveal, for one thing, 
remarkably little about the personal role of the Prime Minister.  Her 
written interventions on this, and most other matters, rarely 
amounted to more than brief remarks scribbled on documents that 
had been presented by other people. From things that other people 
said to her or about her, we can conclude that Thatcher personally 
was in favour of a quick withdrawal when faced with the threat of a 
miners’ strike in 1981 and that she would have preferred, against the 
wishes of the Secretary of State for Energy, to rule out all discussion 
of facing a strike in 1982.  Both these things suggest that she was 
more cautious than some of those who advised her. This not 
surprising.  A Prime Minister, who needs to consider the whole span 
of government activity and every risk on the horizon, might be 
expected to move more slowly than a minister, who only has to think 
about one area of policy, or, a fortiori, an official who is relatively 
insulated from the consequences of political failure.  One should add, 
however, that many around Thatcher did give her personal credit for 
the defeat of the miners.  Perhaps this was simply because they 
believed that she was particularly determined once she had accepted 
that a strike was inevitable.  Perhaps something more subtle was at 
work. Many commented on the way in which Thatcher created a 
certain mood.  One thinks of her private secretary’s remark about her 
‘galvanizing’ effect during the early days of the miners’ strike. 
Perhaps Thatcher’s ministers and officials felt that her style of 
government gave them a licence for radicalism even if she herself 
was sometimes nervous when it came to implementing that 
radicalism. 
 
The information revealed by archival release is also uneven.  In 
particular, there are fewer documents relating to the period between 
the 1983 election and the strike than there are relating to the years 
between February 1981 and May 1983.   This may simply be because 
Peter Walker was less interested in general discussion than his 
predecessor.  It may be because secrecy, always a matter of concern 
on the government side, became even more urgent as the strike 
approached.127   It may, in fact, be that there was an inverse relation 
between words and deeds.  Discussion was, by definition, a sign of 
 
127TFW 152779, on 21 Oct. 1983, Ferdinand Mount wrote to Thatcher insisting 
that ministers advance plans for privatization.  He recognized that ‘Peter 
[Walker] may argue that these issues have to be handled with great secrecy’.  
The last four words have been underlined, presumably by Thatcher. 
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uncertainty.  Long reports and extensive exchanges came when the 
government was deciding what to do.  By the summer of 1983 the 
decisions seem to have been taken and the government was 
reconciled to facing a strike.   
 
The division between words and deeds relates to wider question 
about how Thatcherism has been studied.  An emphasis on 
‘Thatcherism’ can sometimes obscure what the Thatcher 
governments actually did in power.  Interpretations of Thatcherism 
developed before official documents were released. Indeed the word 
‘Thatcherism’ was used before the 1979 election and interpretations 
often emphasise opposition rather than government: one scholar has 
argued that ‘Thatcherite hegemony’ was most marked in the winter 
of 1978/9.128  Furthermore, writers often make much of what 
inhabitants of the ‘Think Tank Archipelago’, such as Alfred Sherman, 
said, rather than what ministers did. 129 Looking at preparation for a 
miners’ strike raises questions about these interpretations.  Radical 
thinkers continued to bombard the Prime Minister with ideas; at the 
beginning of the 1984 strike, Sherman suggested, apparently in all 
seriousness, that the whole mining industry might be converted to an 
enterprise in landscape gardening to repair the aesthetic damage 
done by heavy industry.130 But such ideas had little impact on policy.  
Sometimes radical ideology could become the enemy of practical 
action.  John Hoskyns, for example, combined obsessive concern for 
‘strategic’ thinking with an absence of concrete short-term proposals.  
 
The move from words to deed – from abstract plans to concrete 
action – sometimes went with a move from opposition to 
government but it also went with shifts that happened while 
Thatcher was in office.  The first Thatcher government was often 
marked by pessimism about what could be achieved in the short 
term and curiously this encouraged ambitious but abstract plans 
about what might be done in the long-term future. As time went on, 
however, there was a shift towards thinking about things that might 
be done in the short or medium term. The resignation of John 
Hoskyns, in 1982, and the dissolution of the CPRS in 1983 both went 
 
128Colin Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the ‘Winter of 
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with a diminishing interest in long-term thinking. This was partly 
because, especially as victory in the 1983 election seemed 
increasingly likely, the government was better placed to take 
concrete action.  
 
 
How does all this relate to the nature of Thatcherism?  The 
achievements of the first Thatcher government, particularly during 
its first two years in office, were largely related to monetary and 
fiscal policy.   It often seemed that Thatcherism came primarily from 
the Treasury and that it was driven by small number of key ministers 
in economic departments, who were able to impose policies in these 
areas with comparatively little help from their colleagues and in the 
face of scepticism from civil servants. The power of the NUM was 
inconvenient to the Treasury because it made it difficult to limit 
public spending but preparing to face down a miners’ strike meant, at 
least for a time, turning away from normal Treasury priorities – a 
move that was all the more striking because it was partly undertaken 
under the aegis of Nigel Lawson, who had come from the Treasury in 
September 1981 and who was to return to its head in May 1983, but 
who sometimes came up against his former Treasury colleagues 
during his time as Secretary of State for Energy.   
 
Was preparation to take on the miners Thatcherite at all?  It is true 
that one minister associated with the preparation, Lawson, also saw 
himself as an important exponent of Thatcherism – though, as has 
been suggested, his policy at Energy did not always fit with what he 
had done in his previous office.  It is also true that a number of those 
who thought of themselves as ‘Thatcherite’ presented debate about 
the miners as one that pitted Thatcherites against their enemies. Jim 
Prior, Employment Secretary until May 1981 was an object of 
particular hostility for Thatcherites in this context. Thatcher herself 
had blamed him for the climb-down of February 1981. John Hoskyns 
believed, at the time, that Prior’s replacement by Norman Tebbit, 
along with Lawson’s arrival at Energy, would create a ‘more 
positive’131 climate with regard to the miners and he wrote, in 
retrospect: ‘If Prior had stayed at employment we might have been 
defeated by Scargill, and the Thatcher project could have fizzled 
out.’132 It is possible that Prior made some intervention in February 
 
131TFW 135911, Hoskyns to Thatcher, 11 Dec. 1981.  
132Hoksyns, Just in Time, p. 335. 
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1981 that has left no trace in the archives and it is possible  - just as 
Thatcher was seen to have a ‘galvanizing effect’ - that Prior conveyed 
a mood of pessimism that was separate from any specific proposal 
that he made.  However, the evidence for Prior impeding government 
action is thin. Tebbit’s proposals with regard to the miners were not, 
in fact, very different from those of his predecessor.133 Prior himself 
was to make a distinction in his memoirs:  
 
Generally speaking, I believe that the terms ‘win’ or ‘lose’ should 
never be used in relation to an industrial dispute. The miners’ 
strike of 1983-4 [sic] is, however, the exception which proves 
the rule. In this case, Arthur Scargill’s motives seemed to be 
concerned with the defeat of the democratically elected 
government as much as they were with the issue of pit closures. 
Neither the National Coal Board nor the Government were left 
with any alternative but to fight it through to the bitter end.134 
 
Some of the ministers who did most to prepare for a strike were not 
Thatcherites.  This was true of Whitelaw, the man who launched 
planning for the strike, and Heseltine, who, as Environment 
Secretary, permitted mining in the Vale of Belvoir.  Most of all it was 
true of Peter Walker – Thatcher’s most dogged Cabinet opponent on 
economic policy but also the man who, as Energy Secretary from May 
1983, was responsible for policy during and immediately before the 
strike.   
 
There were bitter exchanges within the government about the 
miners’ strike. However, acrimony sometimes sprang from 
competition rather than conflict.  All regarded beating the miners as 
important and all were keen to exercise control over the policy and 
to claim credit for successes.  Sometimes, policy on the miners was a 
battleground rather than a casus belli: it provided a topic on which 
conflicts that really involved other issues were fought out. Hoskyns, 
 
133TFW 135913, Tebbit to Thatcher, 14 Dec. 1981: ‘In providing for endurance, 
we must avoid providing Scargill with the argument that we are preparing for 
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in particular, sought to use discussion of the NUM to carve out a role 
for the Number 10 Policy Unit, which brought him into conflict with 
ministers, civil servants and other advisors.  The suspiciousness of 
some Thatcherite ministers and the habit of some in Number 10 of 
briefing against ministers exaggerated the impression of division.  
Prior was blamed for the climb down in 1981 when it was Thatcher 
herself who had taken the decision. Walker was blamed for having 
sought to impose a settlement on MacGregor in March 1985 when he 
had, in fact, prevented MacGregor from making a settlement.135 
 
The desire to beat the miners was not confined to Thatcherites or to 
Conservatives - there were times when the government considered 
the help that it might extract from centrist politicians such as the 
Liberal Jo Grimmond.136  It was also not confined to politicians and 
political appointments.  The civil service was particularly important 
in planning for a miners’ strike. This was partly because such 
planning was too complicated to be managed without help from 
officials but it was also because they seem at times to have sought to 
prod their political masters into action. This was seen in Herbecq’s 
recollections of his meetings from 1979, in Le Cheminant’s 
intervention against the February 1981 climb down and in the new 
year’s message that Thatcher’s private secretary sent to her in 1984 
urging her not to support ‘the lifestyle of the miners’ at the expense 
of large electricity users.137  Some of the civil servants involved in this 
process were seen by the Thatcherites as being rebels who were not 
bound by civil service convention. Three of the men concerned –
Duguid, Vereker and Owen – were attached to the Number 10 Policy 
Unit which meant that they worked directly with political 
appointments – though one should stress that these men remained 
civil servants and unlike, say, Bernard Ingham, they eventually 
returned to regular duties.  Similarly, some of those civil servants 
closely attached to Downing Street (Lankester or Turnbull) may have 
found the atmosphere around Thatcher to be conducive to radical 
thinking but they did not think of themselves as having ceased to be 
officials – Turnbull was to rise to be head of the home civil service. 
Most strikingly, Robert Armstrong – the man that Thatcherites most 
often identified as the representative of civil service obstruction – 
seems to have been an energetic executant of policy with regard to 
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the miners and it seems likely that this energy owed much to his 
memories of the Heath government. 
 
Far from being the product of a revolution, which brought a new 
view of what was desirable, policy to the miners reflected an 
evolution as Conservatives, and senior civil servants, gradually 
changed their view of what might be possible.  This did not mark a 
radical break with the Heathite past. The government groped its way 
to 1984.  It did its best to prepare for a strike but it did not anticipate 
the particular form that the strike would take and, even when 
ministers and officials had decided that a strike might be the least 
bad option, they remained nervous. Ministers never felt in complete 
control and often saw themselves as reacting to events rather than 
initiating them.  
 
In 1986, a left-wing historian wrote about the strike.  His aim was to 
answer the criticism levelled at Arthur Scargill, but his words might 
have struck a chord with some of those on the government side:  ‘The 
very idea of executive power is problematic when applied to an 
industrial dispute. A strike is not a controllable process, but a huge 
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